The Politics of Flat Taxes
Jim Dolmas () and
Eric Young ()
No 201442R2, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
We study the political determination of flat tax systems using a workhorse macroeconomic model of inequality. There is significant variation in preferred tax policy across the wealth and income distribution. The majority voting outcome features (i) zero labor income taxation, (ii) simultaneous use of capital income and consumption taxation, and (iii) essentially zero transfers. This policy is supported by a coalition of low- and middle-wealth households. Zero labor income taxation is supported by households with below average wealth, while the middle-wealth households prefer to keep the transfer (and thus other tax rates) low. We also show that the outcome is sensitive to assumptions about the voting power of household groups, the degree of wealth and income mobility, and the forward-looking nature of votes.
Keywords: Incomplete Markets; Voting; Essential Set; Inequality; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D52 D72 E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
Note: First version December 2014, with the title, “Majority Voting: A Quantitative Investigation.” First revision September 2017 with the current title.
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https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-201442r2 Full text (text/html)
Working Paper: The Politics of Flat Taxes (2017)
Journal Article: The Politics of Flat Taxes
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwq:144202
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