The Unintended Consequences of Employer Credit Check Bans on Labor and Credit Markets
Andy Glover and
No 201625R2, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Since the Great Recession, 11 states have restricted employers' access to the credit reports of job applicants. We document that county-level vacancies decline between 9.5 percent and 12.4 percent after states enact these laws. Vacancies decline significantly in affected occupations but remain constant in those that are exempt, and the decline is larger in counties with many subprime residents. Furthermore, subprime borrowers fall behind on more debt payments and reduce credit inquiries postban. The evidence suggests that, counter to their intent, employer credit check bans disrupt labor and credit markets, especially for subprime workers.
Keywords: unemployment rate; credit check; credit score (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J08 J23 J78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-ure
Note: This paper was originally published in November of 2016 and a revision was published in October of 2017. This is the second revision of the paper.
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https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-201625r2 Full text (text/html)
Working Paper: The Unintended Consequences of Employer Credit Check Bans on Labor and Credit Markets (2018)
Working Paper: The Unintended Consequences of Employer Credit Check Bans on Labor and Credit Markets (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwq:162502
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