The Optimal Degree of Monetary-Discretion in a New Keynesian Model with Private Information

Richard Dennis, Ippei Fujiwara and Yuichiro Waki

No 320, Globalization Institute Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Abstract: This paper considers the optimal degree of monetary-discretion when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time, and the central bank takes these restrictions and the New Keynesian Phillips curve as constraints. By solving a dynamic mechanism design problem we find that it is optimal to grant ?constrained discretion? to the central bank by imposing both upper and lower bounds on permissible inflation, and that these bounds should be set in a historydependent way. The optimal degree of discretion varies over time with the severity of the timeinconsistency problem, and, although no discretion is optimal when the time-inconsistency problem is very severe, it is a transient phenomenon and some discretion is granted eventually.

JEL-codes: E52 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2017-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Related works:
Journal Article: The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information (2018)
Working Paper: The Optimal Degree of Monetary-Discretion in a New Keynesian Model with Private Information (2015)
Working Paper: The Optimal Degree of Monetary-Discretion in a New Keynesian Model with Private Information (2015)
Working Paper: The Optimal Degree of Monetary-Discretion in a New Keynesian Model with Private Information (2015)
Working Paper: The Optimal Degree of Monetary-Discretion in a New Keynesian Model with Private Information (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:feddgw:320

DOI: 10.24149/gwp320

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