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Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives

George W. Fenn and J. Nellie Liang ()
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J. Nellie Liang: https://www.brookings.edu/experts/nellie-liang/

No 1999-23, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: We examine how corporate payout policy is affected by managerial stock incentives using data on more than 1100 nonfinancial firms during 1993-97. We find that management share ownership encourages higher payouts by firms with potentially the greatest agency problems--those with low market-to-book ratios and low management stock ownership. We also find that management stock options change the composition of payouts. We find a strong negative relationship between dividends and management stock options, as predicted by Lambert, Lannen, and Larcker (1989), and a positive relationship between repurchases and management stock options. Our results suggest that the growth in stock options may help to explain the rise in repurchases at the expense of dividends.

Keywords: Stocks; Corporate profits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-fin
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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