Market discipline in banking reconsidered: the roles of funding manager decisions and deposit insurance reform

Daniel M. Covitz, Diana Hancock and Myron L. Kwast
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Daniel M. Covitz: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/daniel-m-covitz.htm

No 2004-53, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: We find that the risk-sensitivity of bank holding company subordinated debt spreads at issuance increased with regulatory reforms that were designed to reduce conjectural government guarantees, but declined somewhat with subsequent reforms that were aimed in part at reducing regulatory forbearance. In addition, we test and find evidence for a straightforward form of \"market discipline:\" The extent to which bond issuance penalizes relatively risky banks. Evidence for such discipline only appears in the periods after conjectural government guarantees were reduced.

Keywords: Banks and banking; Risk management; Deposit insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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