Bank Capital Regulations Around the World: What Explains the Differences?
Gazi Kara ()
No 2016-057, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
Despite the extensive attention that the Basel capital adequacy standards have received internationally, significant variation exists in the implementation of these standards across countries. Furthermore, a significant number of countries increase or decrease the stringency of capital regulations over time. The paper investigates the empirical determinants of the variation in the data based on the theories of bank capital regulation. The results show that countries with high average returns to investment and a high ratio of government ownership of banks choose less stringent capital regulation standards. Capital regulations may also be less stringent in countries with more concentrated banking sectors.
Keywords: Capital Requirements; Basel Capital Accord; Financial regulation; International policy coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cba and nep-rmg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2016-57
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