The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation

Rustom M. Irani, Rajkamal Iyer, Ralf R. Meisenzahl and Jose-Luis Peydro

No 2018-039, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed-effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention and nonbanks step in, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce. This reallocation has important spillovers: loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities experience greater sales and price volatility during the 2008 crisis.

Keywords: Shadow banks; Risk-based capital regulation; Basel III; Interactions between banks and nonbanks; Trading by banks; Distressed debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G21 G23 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56 pages
Date: 2018-06-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018039pap.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation (2021)
Journal Article: The rise of shadow banking: Evidence from capital regulation (2021)
Working Paper: The rise of shadow banking: evidence from capital regulation (2020)
Working Paper: The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation (2020)
Working Paper: The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation (2019)
Working Paper: The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2018-39

DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2018.039

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