The Informational Centrality of Banks

Nathan Foley-Fisher, Gary Gorton and Stephane Verani

No 2024-006, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: The equity and debt prices of large nonbank firms contain information about the future state of the banking system. In this sense, banks are informationally central. The amount of this information varies over time and over equity and debt. During a financial crisis banks are, by definition of a crisis, at risk of failure. Debt prices became about 50 percent more informative than equity prices about the future state of the banking system during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. This was partly due to investors' fears that banks might not be able to refinance the firms' debt.

Keywords: Price informativeness; Asset pricing; Banking system; Financial crises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E44 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 66 p.
Date: 2024-02-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
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https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2024006pap.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Informational Centrality of Banks (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2024-06

DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2024.006

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