Labor Market Dynamics, Monetary Policy Tradeoffs, and a Shortfalls Approach to Pursuing Maximum Employment
Brent Bundick,
Isabel Cairo and
Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau
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Brent Bundick: https://www.kansascityfed.org/research-staff/brent-bundick/
No 2025-068, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
Abstract:
This paper reviews recent academic studies to assess the implications of adopting a shortfalls, rather than a deviations, approach to pursuing maximum employment. Model-based simulations from these studies suggest three main findings. First, shortfalls rules generate inflationary pressure relative to deviations rules, which offsets downward pressure on inflation stemming from the presence of the effective lower bound. Second, since monetary policy leans against these inflationary pressures, a shortfalls rule implies a limited effect on average outcomes in the labor market. Finally, studies suggest that monetary policy can offset higher-than-desired average inflation under a shortfalls rule by leaning more strongly against deviations of inflation from the 2 percent objective, thereby keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored.
Keywords: Asymmetric monetary policy strategies; Maximum employment; Effective lower bound (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 p.
Date: 2025-08-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2025-68
DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2025.068
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