EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Why has China survived the Asian crisis so well? What risks remain?

Oliver D. Babson and John Fernald (john.fernald@insead.edu)

No 633, International Finance Discussion Papers from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: China's strong growth in the midst of the Asian crisis is striking. We explore features of China's financial system that helped insulate it from the crisis, and then try to assess whether China has avoided crisis or simply deferred it. We argue that regardless of whether the Asian crisis resulted from weak fundamentals or from \"country runs\" by investors, it is not surprising that China has survived so far. In a market-oriented system, pressures generally force rapid adjustment when institutions are, or are perceived to be, insolvent; these mechanisms do not operate fully in China. In addition, China's external accounts remain strong. Even in the absence of capital controls, the strength of these external fundamentals would plausibly preclude a self-fulfilling \"country run\" on China. Whatever their other effects, capital controls may have played a role in preventing Chinese financial institutions from borrowing excessively abroad, and hence may have helped keep China's external fundamentals strong. Clear risks remain for China's outlook.

Keywords: China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/1999/633/default.htm (text/html)
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/1999/633/ifdp633.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgif:633

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in International Finance Discussion Papers from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ryan Wolfslayer ; Keisha Fournillier (ryan.d.wolfslayer@frb.gov).

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:633