The Inefficient Markets Hypothesis: A Theory of Casino Capitalism
Christian Hellwig
No WP 2026-11, Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Abstract:
I develop a general equilibrium model of investment and equity markets in which departures from the Efficient Markets Hypothesis generate "Casino Capitalism": time-inconsistent, short-termist firm decisions, firm-level over-investment coupled with inefficient liquidation of positive-NPV projects, and aggregate under-investment with depressed stock prices and distorted intertemporal savings. These distortions arise even if all agents are fully rational and forward-looking. At the firm level, the wedge between market-implied and fundamental returns on investment causes an endogenous preference reversal that renders the Laissez-faire outcome time-inconsistent and Pareto-inferior. In the aggregate, firm-level attempts to boost stock prices are self-defeating via an aggregate investment wedge as micro distortions translate into macro inefficiency. Restoring firm-level rationality by empowering shareholders can worsen aggregate outcomes and precipitate a complete capital market shutdown.
Keywords: capital market imperfections; corporate short-termism; casino capitalism; capital misallocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D25 E22 G14 G30 G40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2026-06-17
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedhwp:104146
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DOI: 10.21033/wp-2026-11
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