A proposal for efficiently resolving out-of-the-money swap positions at large insolvent banks

George G. Kaufman

No WP-03-01, Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Abstract: Recent evidence suggests that bank regulators appear to be able to resolve insolvent large banks efficiently without either protecting uninsured deposits through invoking \"too-big-to-fail\" or causing serious harm to other banks or financial markets. But resolving swap positions at insolvent banks, particularly a bank's out-of-the-money positions, has received less attention. The FDIC can now either repudiate these contracts and treat the in-the-money counterparties as at-risk general creditors or transfer the contracts to a solvent bank. Both options have major drawbacks. Terminating contracts abruptly may result in large-fire sale losses and ignite defaults in other swap contracts. Transferring the contracts both is costly to the FDIC and protects the counterparties, who would otherwise be at-risk and monitor their banks. This paper proposes a third option that keeps the benefits of both options but eliminates the undesirable costs. It permits the contracts to be transferred, thus avoiding the potential for fire-sale losses and adverse spillover, but keeps the insolvent bank's in-the-money counterparties at-risk, thus maintaining discipline on banks by large and sophisticated creditors.

Keywords: Deposit insurance; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; Swaps (Finance) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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