CEO overconfidence and dividend policy

Sanjay Deshmukh, Anand Goel () and Keith M. Howe

No WP-09-06, Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Abstract: We develop a model of the effect of CEO overconfidence on dividend policy and empirically examine many of its predictions. Consistent with our main prediction, we find that the level of dividend payout is lower in firms managed by overconfident CEOs. We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities, lower cash flow, and greater information asymmetry. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement is lower for firms managed by overconfident CEOs. Our overall results are consistent with the predictions of our model.

Keywords: Chief executive officers; Dividends (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: CEO overconfidence and dividend policy (2013)
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