What Drives Household Financial Distress? The Role of Earnings Misperceptions
Juan Sanchez and
Stefan Song ()
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Stefan Song: https://economics.wustl.edu/people/yingrui-song
No 2025-030, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Abstract:
Why do households borrow heavily and experience financial distress? We develop and estimate a heterogeneous-agent model of unsecured credit and default in which households learn about income persistence and overreact to recent income realizations. We estimate overreaction using survey measures of income expectations and forecast errors, and the remaining parameters to match household debt and financial distress. Information frictions and estimated overreaction account for roughly half of delinquencies and one-third of bankruptcies, and improve the model’s fit of the observed negative relationship between income and interest rates. Because the models with earnings misperceptions do not need extremely impatient households to match financial distress, policies that substantially reduce financial distress by restricting risky borrowing entail much smaller welfare costs.
Keywords: income; information frictions; overreaction; delinquency; bankruptcy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D14 D84 E21 G51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56 pages
Date: 2025-10-24, Revised 2026-07-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedlwp:101999
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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2025.030
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