Economic models of employee motivation

Joseph Ritter and Lowell Taylor

No 1997-006, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: Workers, being human beings, present employers with a range of tricky problems. Humans, unlike filing cabinets, can be crooked, subversive, surly, or indolent, even if they are paid on time. In this article we explore economists' main models of how compensation is used to address employee motivation and how these models help to explain puzzling features of the labor market.

Keywords: Wages; Management; Labor market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October 1997, 79(5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://s3.amazonaws.com/real.stlouisfed.org/wp/1997/1997-006.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Economic models of employee motivation (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedlwp:1997-006

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

DOI: 10.20955/wp.1997.006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Scott St. Louis ().