The contribution of on-site examination ratings to an emprircal model of bank failures

David Wheelock and Paul Wilson

No 1999-023, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: This paper investigates how well regulator examinations predict bank failures, and how best to incorporate examination information into an econometric model of time-to-failure. We estimate proportional hazard models with time-varying covariates and find that examiner ratings help explain the failure hazard. Both the overall rating of a bank's condition and management, i.e., the composite CAMELS rating, and ratings of specific components contain information. In addition, we find that the marginal \"effect\" of ratings is non-linear, in that the impact of a rating downgrade on the probability of failure is larger, the weaker a bank's initial rating.

Keywords: Bank failures; bank examinations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Review of Accounting and Finance, November 2005, 4(4), pp. 110-34

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Contribution of On‐Site Examination Ratings to an Empirical Model of Bank Failures (2005)
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DOI: 10.20955/wp.1999.023

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