Patent licensing revisited: heterogeneous firms and product differentiation
Ruben Hernandez-Murillo and
Gerard Llobet
No 2002-031, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Abstract:
In this paper we study the optimal licensing agreement between a patentholder of a cost-reducing innovation and firms that have heterogeneous uses for the new technology. We consider the case in which these firms are competitors in a downstream market. We extend the competition environment among the licensees beyond the Cournot/Bertrand models considered by the previous literature to a framework with differentiated products. We also assume that potential licensees have private information about the usefulness of the new technology. We characterize two purposes the optimal licensing contract serves to the patentholder: separation of the licensees and competition softening in the downstream market. We also describe how the optimal contract changes with the degree of product differentiation.
Keywords: Patents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, January 2006, 24(1), pp. 149-75
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Related works:
Journal Article: Patent licensing revisited: Heterogeneous firms and product differentiation (2006) 
Working Paper: Patent Licensing Revisited: Heterogeneous Firms and Product Differentiation (2003) 
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