Political allocation of U.S. agriculture disaster payments in the 1990s

Thomas Garrett, Thomas Marsh and Maria Marshall

No 2003-005, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: Legislation passed during the 1990s attempted to move U.S. agriculture disaster relief to a more market oriented process. The failure of this legislation has been attributed to the political system behind agricultural disaster relief. This paper explores the impact of political influence on the allocation of U.S. direct agriculture disaster payments. The results reveal that disaster payments are not based solely on need, but are higher in those states represented by public officials key to the allocation of relief. The effectiveness of legislation aimed at promoting more efficient disaster payments systems, such as crop insurance, over direct cash payments is also examined.

Keywords: Agriculture; Disaster relief (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political allocation of US agriculture disaster payments in the 1990s (2006)
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