Foreign entry and bank competition
No 2006-043, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals: the entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent's informational advantage. Both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets. The entrant's success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by offering cheaper loans increases with its efficiency (cost) advantage. This paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large firms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises. The results also explain why this observed \\"bias\\" is stronger in emerging markets.
Keywords: Credit control; Bank competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006, Revised 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-com, nep-eff and nep-fmk
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Published in Journal of Financial Economics, May 2007, 84(2), pp. 502-28
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Journal Article: Foreign entry and bank competition (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2006-043
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