The interplay between preemptive and defensive counterterrorism measures: a two-stage game

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Todd Sandler

No 2008-034, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: A two-stage game depiction of counterterrorism is presented, where the emphasis is on the interaction between the preemptive and defensive measures taken by two targeted countries facing a common threat. The preemptor is likely to be the high-cost defender with the greater foreign interests. A prime-target country may also assume the preemptor role. The analysis identifies key factors - cost comparisons, foreign interests, and targeting risks - that determine counterterrorism allocations. The study shows that the market failures associated with preemptive and defensive countermeasures may be jointly ameliorated by a disadvantaged defender. Nevertheless, the subgame perfect equilibrium will still be suboptimal owing to a preemption choice that does not fully internalize the externalities.

Keywords: Terrorism; War - Economic aspects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures: A Two‐stage Game (2011)
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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2008.034

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