Cross-border lobbying in preferential trading agreements: implications for external tariffs

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Sajal Lahiri and Howard Wall

No 2009-041, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: This paper examines the effect of cross-border lobbying on domestic lobbying and on external tariffs in both Customs Union (CU) and Free Trade Area (FTA). We do so by developing a two-stage game which endogenizes the tariff formation function in a political economic model of the directly unproductive rent-seeking activities type. We find that cross-border lobbying unambiguously increases both domestic lobbying and the equilibrium common external tariffs in a CU. The same result also holds for FTA provided tariffs for the member governments are strategic complements. We also develop a specific oligopolistic model of FTA and show that tariffs are indeed strategic complements in such a model.

Keywords: Free trade; Tariff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-pol
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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2009.041

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