The Value of Constraints on Discretionary Government Policy

Fernando Martin

No 2016-19, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: This paper investigates how institutional constraints discipline the behavior of discretionary governments subject to an expenditure bias. The focus is on constraints implemented in actual economies: monetary policy targets, limits on the deficit and debt ceilings. For a variety of aggregate shocks considered, the best policy is to impose a minimum primary surplus of about half a percent of output. Most welfare gains from constraining government behavior during normal times, which to a large extent is sufficient to discipline policy in adverse times. Monetary policy targets are not generally desirable as they hinder the ability of governments to smooth distortions. Allowing for the effective use of inflation during transitions is a key component of good institutional design. Debt ceilings are benign, but always dominated by deficit constraints. More pre-commitment to government actions is ineffective in curbing inefficiently high public expenditure.

Keywords: time-consistency; discretion; government debt; inflation; deficit; fiscal constraints; inflation targeting; institutional design; political frictions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 E61 E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2016-02-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Value of Constraints on Discretionary Government Policy (2018)
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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2016.019

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