Investment and Bilateral Insurance

Emilio Espino (), Julian Kozlowski and Juan Sanchez

No 2013-001, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: Private information may limit insurance possibilities when two agents get together to pool idiosyncratic risk. However, if there is capital accumulation, bilateral insurance possibilities may improve because misreporting distorts investment. We show that if one of the Pareto weights is sufficiently large, that agent does not have incentives to misreport. This implies that, under some conditions, the full information allocation is incentive compatible when agents have equal Pareto weights. In the long run, either one of the agents goes to immiseration, or both agents’ lifetime utilities are approximately equal. The second case is only possible with capital accumulation.

Keywords: Investment; Bilateral Insurance; Private Information; Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11
Date: 2013-01-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory

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Journal Article: Investment and bilateral insurance (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedlwp:86673

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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2013.001

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