Dynamic Gains from Trade Agreements with Intellectual Property Provisions
Ana Maria Santacreu
No 2021-010, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
I develop a quantitative multi-country trade model of innovation and technology licensing to study the short- and long-term effects of trade agreements with intellectual property (IP) provisions. A trade agreement involves determining the level of tariffs and IP protection as Nash bargaining between a developed and a developing country. The agreement increases welfare, innovation, and growth in the long-run. However, gains accrue differently across countries along the transition. Developing countries experience short-run losses, as they now pay higher licensing prices. An agreement designed by a politically-motivated government could mitigate these losses, but at the expense of lower growth and welfare.
Keywords: Technology Licensing; Trade Agreements; Intellectual Property Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 O33 O41 O47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2021-07-20, Revised 2022-05-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-ino, nep-int and nep-ipr
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