Dynamic Gains from Trade Agreements with Intellectual Property Provisions

Ana Maria Santacreu

No 2021-010, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: I develop a quantitative theory of bilateral trade agreements with intellectual property (IP) provisions in a multi-country growth model. The model’s dynamics are driven by innovation and technology licensing. Imperfect IP enforcement leads to reduced royalty payments and growth. Governments negotiate tariffs and IP enforcement through Nash bargaining. Gains from the trade agreement vary along the transition. Developing countries experience short-term losses, while developed countries gain in both the short and long run. A government with short-term goals may reduce losses but at the cost of lower growth and welfare. Tariffs could discourage developing countries from deviating from the agreement.

Keywords: technology licensing; trade agreements; intellectual property rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 O33 O41 O47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 76 pages
Date: 2021-07-20, Revised 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-ino, nep-int and nep-ipr
Note: Publisher DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/734094
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Political Economy

Downloads: (external link)
https://s3.amazonaws.com/real.stlouisfed.org/wp/2021/2021-010.pdf Full Text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedlwp:93276

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

DOI: 10.20955/wp.2021.010

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Scott St. Louis ().