On the Economic Mechanics of Warfare

Guillaume Vandenbroucke

No 2023-007, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: How do war-related expenditures affect economically-relevant outcomes at a war’s conclusion (e.g., prevailing side, duration, and casualties)? I present a model of attrition and characterize the effects of resources at a military conclusion (one side cannot fight anymore) and a political conclusion (one side quits). I analyze the Pacific War through the lenses of the model both theoretically and empirically. I find that a parsimonious parameterization reproduces well the aggregate patterns of destruction, measured in ship tonnage, for both belligerents.

Keywords: war; attrition; military spending (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E6 H56 N4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2023-04, Revised 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis and nep-tra
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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2023.007

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