Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states

Harold Cole and Narayana Kocherlakota

No 254, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: We consider a class of dynamic games in which each player?s actions are unobservable to the other players and each player?s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies depend on private information only through the privately observed state.

Keywords: Game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic Games with Hidden Actions and Hidden States (2001)
Working Paper: Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:254

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