Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states

Harold Cole and Narayana Kocherlakota

No 583, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: We consider the large class of dynamic games in which each player?s actions are unobservable to the other players, and each player?s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies are Markov in the privately observed state.

Keywords: Game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic Games with Hidden Actions and Hidden States (2001)
Working Paper: Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmwp:583

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