Financial networks: contagion, commitment, and private sector bailouts

Yaron Leitner

No 02-9, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Abstract: The author develops a model of financial networks where linkages not only spread contagion, but also induce private-sector bailouts in which liquid banks bail out illiquid banks because of the threat of contagion. Introducing this bailout possibility, the author shows that linkages may be optimal ex-ante because they allow banks to obtain some mutual insurance even though formal commitments are impossible. However, in some cases (for example, when liquidity is concentrated among a small group of banks), the whole network may collapse. The author also characterizes the optimal network size and apply the results to joint liability arrangements and payment systems.> Original working paper title: Fragile financial networks.

Keywords: Financial; markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Finance, 60, no. 6 (December, 2005) : 2925-2953

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