Polarized Contributions but Convergent Agendas

Thorsten Drautzburg, Igor Livshits and Mark Wright

No 26-05, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Abstract: In a canonical model of policy formation, campaign contributions, and electoral competition, we show that, despite donor polarization, candidates’ agendas converge. If purely office-motivated candidates move away from the centrist agenda, they increase their opponents’ contributions more than their own. An extension that introduces a “job ladder” for the candidates leads to candidates caring about absolute levels of campaign contributions and generates divergence of political agendas in equilibrium. We provide empirical evidence of campaign contributions affecting candidates’ chances of “promotion,” and characterize key comparative statics of the extended model. In the model, caps on campaign contributions lower polarization in equilibrium.

Keywords: Polarization; Campaign Contributions; Agendas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50
Date: 2026-03-03
Note: supersedes WP 22-29
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Related works:
Working Paper: Polarized Contributions but Convergent Agendas (2022)
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DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2026.05

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