A cost-benefit analysis of judicial foreclosure delay and a preliminary look at new mortgage servicing rules
Lawrence R. Cordell and
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Lawrence R. Cordell: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Lauren Lambie-Hanson: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
No 15-14, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Since the start of the financial crisis, we have seen an extraordinary lengthening of foreclosure timelines, particularly in states that require judicial review to complete a foreclosure but also recently in nonjudicial states. Our analysis synthesizes findings from several lines of research, updates results, and presents new analysis to examine the costs and benefits of judicial foreclosure review. Consistent with previous studies, we find that judicial review imposes large costs with few, if any, offsetting benefits. We also provide early analysis of the new mortgage servicing rules enacted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and find that these rules are contributing to even longer timelines, especially in nonjudicial states.
Keywords: Mortgage; Foreclosure; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 L85 R21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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