Financial Contracting with Enforcement Externalities

Lukasz Drozd and Ricardo Serrano-Padial

No 18-21, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Abstract: We study the negative feedback loop between the aggregate default rate and the efficacy of enforcement in a model of debt-financed entrepreneurial activity. The novel feature of our model is that enforcement capacity is accumulated ex ante and thus subject to depletion ex post. We characterize the effect of shocks that deplete enforcement resources on the aggregate default rate and credit supply. In the model default decisions by entrepreneurs are strategic complements, leading to multiple equilibria. We propose a global game selection to overcome equilibrium indeterminacy and show how shocks that deplete enforcement capacity can lead to a spike in the aggregate default rate and trigger credit rationing.

Keywords: contract enforcement; default spillovers; credit crunch; credit cycles; global games; heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D84 D86 G21 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2018-10-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Financial contracting with enforcement externalities (2018)
Working Paper: Financial contracting with enforcement externalities (2016)
Working Paper: Financial Contracting with Enforcement Externalities (2015)
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DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2018.21

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