History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt

Pablo D'Erasmo and Enrique Mendoza

No 19-31, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Abstract: Infrequent but turbulent overt sovereign defaults on domestic creditors are a ?for- gotten history? in macroeconomics. We propose a heterogeneous-agents model in which the government chooses optimal debt and default on domestic and foreign creditors by balancing distributional incentives versus the social value of debt for self-insurance, liquidity, and risk-sharing. A rich feedback mechanism links debt issuance, the distribution of debt holdings, the default decision, and risk premia. Calibrated to Eurozone data, the model is consistent with key long-run and debt-crisis statistics. Defaults are rare (1.2 percent frequency) and preceded by surging debt and spreads. Debt sells at the risk-free price most of the time, but the government?s lack of commitment reduces sustainable debt sharply.

Keywords: public debt; sovereign defaults; debt crisis; European crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 E6 F34 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 88 pages
Date: 2019-07-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-opm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: History remembered: Optimal sovereign default on domestic and external debt (2021)
Working Paper: History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt (2018)
Working Paper: History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt (2018)
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DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2019.31

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