Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation
Robert Hunt () and
No 21-38, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
We construct a two-period model of revolving credit with asymmetric information and adverse selection. In the second period, lenders exploit an informational advantage with respect to their own customers. Those rents stimulate competition for customers in the first period. The informational advantage the current lender enjoys relative to its competitors determines interest rates, credit supply, and switching behavior. We evaluate the consequences of limiting the repricing of existing balances as implemented by recent legislation. Such restrictions increase deadweight losses and reduce ex-ante consumer surplus. The model suggests novel approaches to identify empirically the effects of this law. We find the pattern of changes to interest rates and balance transfer activity before and after the CARD Act are consistent with the testable implications of the model.
Keywords: Financial contracts; Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act; holdup; risk-based pricing; credit supply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D14 D18 D86 G28 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-com, nep-law, nep-pay and nep-reg
Note: Supersedes Working Paper 18-23 – Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/asset ... ers/2021/wp21-38.pdf (text/html)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden
Working Paper: Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedpwp:93394
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Beth Paul ().