Information revelation in procurement auctions: an equivalence result

Domenico Colucci, Nicola Doni () and Vincenzo Valori

No 2012-07, Working Papers - Mathematical Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: Procurement auctions often involve quality considerations as a determinant of the final outcome. When qualities are the procurer’s private information then various information policies may be used to affect the expected outcome. For auctions with two cost heterogeneous suppliers, this work defines a notion of duality between pairs of policies, and shows that dual policies are revenue equivalent.

Keywords: procurement; information revelation; discriminatory policy; asymmetric auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Information revelation in procurement auctions: an equivalence result (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:flo:wpaper:2012-07

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