Information revelation in procurement auctions: an equivalence result
Nicola Doni and
Vincenzo Valori ()
Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
Procurement auctions often involve quality considerations as a determinant of the final outcome. When the procurer has private information about qualities, various information policies may be used to affect the expected outcome. For auctions with two cost heterogeneous suppliers, this work defines a notion of duality between pairs of policies, and shows that dual policies are revenue equivalent.
Keywords: procurement; information revelation; discriminatory policy; asymmetric auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-reg
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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Working Paper: Information revelation in procurement auctions: an equivalence result (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2019/248
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