Anonymous and neutral majority rules

Daniela Bubboloni () and Michele Gori

No 2013-02, Working Papers - Mathematical Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and neutral majority rules. We determine also general formulas for counting these rules and we explicitly determine their number in some special cases.

Keywords: Social welfare function; anonymity; neutrality; majority; linear order; group theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2013-02, Revised 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Anonymous and neutral majority rules (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:flo:wpaper:2013-02

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