Anonymous and neutral majority rules

Daniela Bubboloni () and Michele Gori

Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 43, issue 2, 377-401

Abstract: In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and neutral majority rules. We also determine a general method for constructing and counting these rules and we explicitly apply it to some simple cases. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Anonymous and neutral majority rules (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0787-2

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