Self-Confidence and Survival
Heski Bar-Isaac ()
FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group
We consider the impact of history on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods, whose quality is learned slowly. If the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling. When she knows her quality, a good seller never stops selling. Furthermore, a seller with positive, though imperfect, information sells for the same number of periods whether her information is private or public. We further consider the robustness of the central result when the sellers opportunities for strategic behaviour are limited.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Self-Confidence and Survival (2001)
Working Paper: Self-confidence and survival (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp395
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The FMG Administration ().