Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance

Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Giné and Maria Guadalupe ()

FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group

Abstract: This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (4.6%) and to improvements in long-term performance: profitability and labor productivity increase, while overheads and investment fall. In contrast, we find limited effects on pay levels and structure. This suggests that SoP operates as a regular vote of confidence, increasing efficiency and market value.

Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/fmgdps/DP724.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance (2016)
Working Paper: Say pays! Shareholder voice and firm performance (2016)
Working Paper: Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance (2014)
Working Paper: Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance (2014)
Working Paper: Say pays! Shareholder voice and firm performance (2013)
Working Paper: Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance (2013)
Working Paper: Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp724

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The FMG Administration ().