Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance

Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Gine and Maria Guadalupe ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (4.6%) and to improvements in long-term performance: profitability and labor productivity increase, while overheads and investment fall. In contrast, we find limited effects on pay levels and structure. This suggests that SoP operates as a regular vote of confidence, increasing efficiency and market value.

Keywords: Say-on-Pay; Shareholder Voice; Executive Compensation; Firm Performance; Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L20 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48489/1/MPRA_paper_48489.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance (2016)
Working Paper: Say pays! Shareholder voice and firm performance (2016)
Working Paper: Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance (2014)
Working Paper: Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance (2014)
Working Paper: Say pays! Shareholder voice and firm performance (2013)
Working Paper: Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance (2013)
Working Paper: Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:48489

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().