Nudge for (the Public) Good: How Defaults can affect Cooperation
Toke Reinholt Fosgaard Fosgaard () and
Marco Piovesan ()
Additional contact information
Toke Reinholt Fosgaard Fosgaard: Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
No 2015/11, IFRO Working Paper from University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics
In this paper we test the effect of non-binding defaults on the level of contribution to a public good. We manipulate the default numbers appearing on the decision screen to nudge subjects toward a free-rider strategy or a perfect conditional cooperator strategy. Our results show that the vast majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where there default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free rider default were significantly less cooperative than those who saw the perfect conditional cooperator default.
Keywords: Cooperation; Nudging (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2015_11
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IFRO Working Paper from University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Geir Tveit ().