Decentralized Task Coordination

Jens Gudmundsson, Jens Hougaard () and Trine Platz

No 2020/11, IFRO Working Paper from University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics

Abstract: We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism's recognition function. We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task allocation and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings.

Keywords: Decentralized mechanisms; Implementation; Bargaining; Consistency; Blockchain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D47 D63 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pay
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http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/WPpdf/WP2020/IFRO_WP_2020_11.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Decentralized task coordination (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2020_11

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