Decentralized task coordination

Jens Gudmundsson, Jens Leth Hougaard and Trine Platz

European Journal of Operational Research, 2023, vol. 304, issue 2, 851-864

Abstract: We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms, in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism’s recognition function. We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task allocation and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings.

Keywords: Game theory; Decentralized mechanisms; Implementation; Bargaining; Consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D47 D63 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Decentralized Task Coordination (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:304:y:2023:i:2:p:851-864

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.04.026

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