Control Aversion in Hierarchies
Alessandro De Chiara,
Holger Herz and
Ester Manna ()
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Alessandro De Chiara: Universitat de Barcelona
No 527, FSES Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland
Companies typically control various aspects of their workers' behaviors. In this paper, we investigate whether the hierarchical distance of the superior who imposes such control measures matters for the workers' ensuing reaction. In particular, we test, in a laboratory experiment, whether potential negative behavioral reactions to imposed control are larger when they are implemented by a direct superior rather than a hierarchically more distant superior. We find that hierarchical proximity indeed magni es such control aversion and discuss several potential channels for this result.
Keywords: Control Aversion; Hierarchies; Delegation; Principal-Agent-Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hrm
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Working Paper: Control Aversion in Hierarchies (2022)
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