Competition between State Universities

Lisa Grazzini, Annalisa Luporini () and Alessandro Petretto ()

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may a¤ect both the quality of teaching and research. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that di¤erent types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of research and teaching activity supplied by each university, and the mix of low and high ability students attending each university. The most e¢ cient equilibrium results in the creation of an élite institution attended only by high ability students. Low ability students are segregated in the other university, but obtain the same teaching quality level and pay the same tuition fees.

Keywords: University Competition; Research; Tuition Fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H52 I22 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition between State Universities (2011)
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