Competition between State Universities

Lisa Grazzini, Annalisa Luporini () and Alessandro Petretto ()

No 3373, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that different types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of research and teaching supplied by each university, and the mix of low- and high-ability students attending each university. The most efficient equilibrium results in the creation of an élite institution attended only by high-ability students who enjoy a higher teaching quality but pay higher tuition fees.

Keywords: university competition; research; tuition fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H52 I22 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Competition between State Universities (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3373

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