Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon

Federico Etro (), Silvia Marchesi and Elena Stepanova

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: We analyze the art market in Paris between the government-controlled Salon as a centralized organization for art exhibition and the post-1880 system when the Republican government liberalized art exhibitions. The jury of the old Salon decided on submissions with a bias toward conservative art of the academic insiders, erecting entry barriers against outsiders as the Impressionists. With a difference-in difference estimation, we provide evidence that the end of the government-controlled Salon contributed to start the increase of the prices of the Impressionists relative to the insiders.

Keywords: Liberalization; Market structure; Insider-Outsider; Hedonic regressions; Impressionism; Art market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 Z11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul
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https://www.disei.unifi.it/upload/sub/pubblicazioni/repec/pdf/wp22_2019.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Liberalizing art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon (2020)
Working Paper: Liberalizing Art: Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon (2020)
Working Paper: Liberalizing Art: Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon (2019)
Working Paper: Liberalizing Art Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon (2018)
Working Paper: Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon (2018)
Working Paper: Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon (2018)
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