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Liberalizing Art Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon

Federico Etro (), Silvia Marchesi () and Elena Stepanova

No 18-028, Working Papers CEB from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We analyze the Paris art market between the government-controlled Salon as a centralized organization of art exhibition and the system liberalized by the Republican government based on competition between independent exhibitions. The jury of the old Salon decided on submissions with a bias toward conservative art of the academic insiders, reducing demand for the outsiders, as confirmed by the impact on prices of the acceptance of Impressionists. With a difference-in difference estimation we provide evidence that the end of the government-controlled Salon in 1880 started the increase of the prices of the Impressionists relative to the insiders.

Keywords: Art market; Market structure; Insider-Outsider; Hedonic regressions; Impressionism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 Z11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul
Date: 2018-10-22
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Working Paper: Liberalizing Art: Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Liberalizing Art. Evidence on the Impressionists at the end of the Paris Salon (2018) Downloads
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