A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition

R. Cardarelli, Emmanuelle Taugourdeau and J.-P. Vidal

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: Models of tax competition usually assume a single period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition, and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interaction between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy harmonization can not prevail when regional asymmetries are too strong. In such a case, the only way out is to set up a central fiscal authority.

Keywords: TAXATION; FISCAL POLICY; ENTERPRISES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition (2002)
Working Paper: A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:99a34

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