A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition

R. Cardarelli, Emmanuelle Taugourdeau and J.-P. Vidal

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: Models of tax competition usually assume a single period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition, and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interactions between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy harmonization can not prevail when regional asymmetries are too strong. In such a case, the only way out is to set up a central fiscal authority.

Keywords: COMPETITION; INTERNATIONAL POLITICS; TAXATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F2 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition (2002)
Working Paper: A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:1999.73

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) France; Universite de Paris I - Pantheon- Sorbonne, 12 Place de Pantheon-75005 Paris, France. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().